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Humans enjoy a private, mental life that is richer and more vivid than that of any
other animal. Yet as central as the conscious experience is to human life, numerous
disciplines have long struggled to explain it. The present paper reviews the latest theories
and evidence from psychology that addresses what conscious thought is and how it
affects human behavior. We suggest that conscious thought adapts human behavior to
life in complex society and culture. First, we review research challenging the common
notion that conscious thought directly guides and controls action. Second, we present an
alternative view—that conscious thought processes actions and events that are typically
removed from the here and now, and that it indirectly shapes action to favor culturally
adaptive responses. Third, we summarize recent empirical work on conscious thought,
which generally supports this alternative view. We see conscious thought as the place
where the unconscious mind assembles ideas so as to reach new conclusions about how
best to behave, or what outcomes to pursue or avoid. Rather than directly controlling
action, conscious thought provides the input from these kinds of mental simulations
to the executive. Conscious thought offers insights about the past and future, socially
shared information, and cultural rules. Without it, the complex forms of social and cultural
coordination that define human life would not be possible.
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Humans enjoy a private, mental life that is richer and more vivid
than that of any other animal (e.g., Damasio, 1999; Edelman,
2004; Suddendorf, 2006). Yet as central as the conscious expe-
rience is to human life, numerous disciplines have long strug-
gled to explain it (e.g., Blackmore, 2005). The present paper
reviews the latest theories and evidence from psychology that
addresses what conscious thought is and how it affects human
behavior.
Our focus is on the type of conscious experience that is unique
to humans. A common practice in discussions of conscious-
ness is to distinguish between two levels (e.g., Damasio, 1999;
Edelman, 2004). The first level, phenomenal awareness, is shared
by humans with most other animals. It comprises the experi-
ence of sensations, feelings, or qualia. The second level, conscious
thought, is largely unique to humans and includes self-awareness,
inner reflections, and deliberations. This paper reviews the latest
research on the link between this second level of conscious-
ness and human action. Earlier and more extensive treatment of
these issues is available in Baumeister andMasicampo (2010) and
Baumeister et al. (2011).
We suggest that conscious thought adapts human behavior
to life in complex society and culture. First, we review research
challenging the common notion that conscious thought directly
controls action. Second, we present an alternative view—that
conscious thought processes actions and events that are typi-
cally removed from the here and now, and that it indirectly
shapes action to favor culturally adaptive responses. Third, we
summarize recent empirical work on conscious thought, which
generally supports this alternative view.
QUESTIONING CONSCIOUS THOUGHT AS THE CONTROLLER
OF ACTION
A commonly held view assumes that conscious thought is in
charge of behavior (e.g., Wegner, 2002). However, several decades
of psychology research have challenged this notion. The find-
ings have shown that conscious thought has limited access to
the mind’s inner workings, while revealing that the unconscious
is capable of initiating and guiding behavior without help from
conscious thought.
THE LIMITATIONS OF CONSCIOUS THOUGHT
If conscious thought were in charge of behavior, then people
could presumably report and explain their actions accurately. To
the contrary, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) showed repeatedly that
people who were asked to explain their actions would overlook
factors that had demonstrably large influences on their behav-
ior. People even denied those influences when asked about them
directly. Thus, when people introspect about their behaviors, they
seem incapable of retrieving accurate accounts of what they did
and why.
Gazzaniga (2000) has suggested that people explain their
behaviors by fabricating stories. In his research, brain dam-
aged patients who could not explain their behaviors accurately
were nevertheless quick to provide plausible, though obviously
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false, explanations for their actions. More recent research has
demonstrated a similar phenomenon in normally functioning
adults (Johansson et al., 2005). This work employed sleight of
hand to dupe participants into explaining decisions they did
not make. Most participants failed to notice that these were
not their decisions. Furthermore, they had no problem pro-
viding quick and elaborate explanations for why they made
them, even though the explanations could not have possibly
been true. The general pattern thus seems to be that people
are unaware of their own behaviors. If the conscious self can-
not recognize its own actions, it is unlikely that it controls
them.
A further limitation of conscious thought is that it is too
slow to initiate behavior. Libet (1985) observed people as they
decided to initiate simple motor movements. His data revealed
that conscious choices were too delayed to be the true source of
behavior. Unconscious processes, on the other hand, were much
earlier indicators of action (in milliseconds; for a recent concep-
tual replication of Libet’s work, see Soon et al., 2008). Even for
more complex decisions, such as how to vote in an upcoming elec-
tion, conscious decisions appear days after the unconscious has
made up its mind (Galdi et al., 2008). According to these findings,
the conscious self receives its information too late in the chain of
events to be the initiator of behavior.
THE DYNAMIC UNCONSCIOUS
Other work has revealed that unconscious processes are capable
of initiating and guiding action, including for complex behaviors
once thought to require conscious control. Bargh and his col-
leagues (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999; Bargh and Morsella, 2008)
have argued that most human behaviors are initiated automati-
cally and unconsciously in response to environmental cues. Many
social motives and goals have been shown to operate in this way.
The mere exposure to words related to achievement can trigger
a range of motivated behaviors aimed at attaining mastery over
later tasks (Bargh et al., 2001). Crucially, participants are typically
unaware of these environmental influences on their behavior.
Thus, the initiation and subsequent regulation of behavior occurs
despite the person having no conscious awareness of the process,
including for complex sets of actions.
Thus, the emerging view in recent decades has been that con-
scious thought is not the all-powerful controller of behavior that
many perceive it to be (Pocket, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2005).
The conscious self is often mistaken about what it does and why.
Furthermore, the unconscious seems capable of guiding much of
what people do. If conscious thought affects human action, it is
not in the manner of controlling moment-to-moment actions. Its
influence on behavior must lie elsewhere.
CONSCIOUS THOUGHT SERVES SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
FUNCTIONS
The above empirical work has prompted a revised understanding
of how conscious thought relates to action (e.g., Wegner, 2002;
Pocket, 2004). Some have speculated that there is no role for con-
scious thought in determining behavior (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al.,
2005). In our more positive view, nature would not have equipped
humankind with such a complex capacity as conscious thought if
it did not serve an adaptive function. We propose that conscious
thought may have powerful indirect effects on behavior even if
it does not directly control it. Furthermore, given the uniquely
human nature of conscious thought, we suggest it likely serves
uniquely human needs—particularly, social and cultural ones.
SOCIAL COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION
We propose that conscious thought enables coordination with
the social and cultural environment (Baumeister andMasicampo,
2010). Our thinking follows other perspectives that emphasize
social pressures as the driver of uniquely human mental capac-
ities. These have argued that primate intelligence evolved for
the purpose of adapting to social life (Byrne and Whiten, 1988;
Dunbar, 1998), with humans further evolving the motivation
to understand others’ mental states and to communicate their
own mental states with others (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al.,
2005). We propose that this pressure to communicate with others
transformed thinking from an individual capacity to a social one.
James (1890) famously asserted that “thinking is for doing.”
We suggest that much of conscious thinking might instead (or
also) be for talking. Consistent with that view, conscious thought
and speech seem to emerge in complementary ways both in phy-
logeny and in development (see Baumeister and Masicampo,
2010). The link between conscious thought and speech is also
observable among adults, in whom the full processing of language
requires conscious thought (Greenwald and Liu, 1985), and con-
scious thinking suffers if inner speech is suppressed (Emerson and
Miyake, 2003).
We suggest that conscious thought and communication afford
numerous advantages. People who share their thoughts within a
group can correct one another’s mistakes, and so talking enables
drawing on others’ wisdom. People who communicate can also
reach agreements with one another, taking into account others’
intentions, knowledge, and resources. Thus, talking also allows for
coordination and collaborative planning.
WHY COMMUNICATION REQUIRES CONSCIOUS THOUGHT
The proposition that conscious thoughts are largely for com-
municating does not by itself explain how conscious thoughts
influence action or why they need be conscious in the first place.
One answer to these questions was provided by Morsella (2005)
to explain phenomenal awareness, and his answer applies to con-
scious thought as well. He argued that consciousness allows for
communication across disparate parts of the mind, so that inner
conflicts can be resolved. For organisms with few motivations,
responses to sensory input can be supplied with relatively little
information processing. For humans and most animals, however,
motivations co-occur and conflict. In these situations, different
parts of the mind offer diverging prescriptions for behavior. One
part urges the body to flee while another calls on it to stay put.
A major function of consciousness is to broadcast incoming sen-
sory input to the disparate parts of the mind so that multiple
needs may be negotiated and an optimal course of action taken.
Phenomenal consciousness allows conflicts originating from the
physical environment to be resolved. In humans, we propose that
conscious thought enables conflicts originating from society and
culture to be resolved as well.
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A second answer to the questions about the utility of con-
sciousness is that conscious thought makes possible certain kinds
of information processing that the unconscious cannot perform.
Specifically, we see conscious thought as the place where the
unconscious creates meaningful sequences of events or ideas.
Language is one important example. The unconscious can pro-
cess only single words, but conscious thought can combine
words into meaningful sentences (Baars, 2002). Furthermore,
the amount of information that can be communicated in sen-
tences is infinitely more than the amount that can be captured
in single words. It is only through the integrative serial pro-
cessing afforded by conscious thought that the mind can com-
bine simple concepts to produce novel conclusions. Indeed, we
argue that a key function of conscious thought is to enable
the unconscious to derive new insights from the information it
already has.
Many types of thinking are made possible by conscious
thought, and each provides a means for the unconscious to reach
new conclusions without acquiring additional outside informa-
tion. These include logical reasoning, quantification, and causal
understanding (e.g., DeWall et al., 2008). As with language, each
of these thought processes involves combining simple ideas in
accordance with shared rules. Furthermore, we propose that each
produces novel conclusions that can be communicated to others
or incorporated into one’s own decisions and behaviors.
These categories of sequential thought may seem non-social,
but we argue that each is a cultural process. Each type of thought
employs rules communicated within culture. And each allows
individuals to operate successfully within the culture, whether it is
used to cooperate with others, justify one’s actions (Haidt, 2007),
or argue (Mercier and Sperber, 2011).
TRANSLATING CONSCIOUS THOUGHT INTO ACTION
Conscious thought influences action via mental simulation
(Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010). Much of conscious think-
ing involves simulating non-present events (Kane et al., 2007;
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010), as when people relive past expe-
riences, anticipate desired futures, consume fiction, or daydream.
Thus, conscious thought focuses frequently on non-present infor-
mation rather than on current actions. Furthermore, mental
simulations incorporate both of the features of conscious thought
discussed above. They comprise meaningful sequences of events,
at times incorporating the types of thinking already mentioned
(e.g., logical reasoning, quantification, causality). And they allow
for inner crosstalk and conflict resolution (e.g., Morsella, 2005).
A person can imagine the outcome of engaging in a certain
behavior, and the various parts of the mind can access the simula-
tion, objecting as problems arise. By mentally simulating positive
and negative behaviors and outcomes, individuals can learn to
perform or avoid them (e.g., Grouios, 1992).
We suggest the power of conscious thought is not in the
direct control of action, as common views assume. Rather, its
power lies in processing information from society and culture. It
takes in information, and it combines it into meaningful men-
tal simulations constructed according to cultural rules. These
simulations can be used to determine optimal outcomes or to
rehearse optimal ways of behaving. Thus, conscious thought
allows individuals to translate information from culture into
socially adaptive responses.
THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FOR EFFECTS OF
CONSCIOUS THOUGHT ON BEHAVIOR
We recently reviewed the literature for evidence of conscious
causation of behavior (Baumeister et al., 2011). Our review
surveyed experiments in which conscious thoughts were manip-
ulated by random assignment and effects on outward behavior
were measured. By the logic of experimental design, such find-
ings indicate that the conscious thought caused behavior. We
identified many such phenomena, which had the following three
themes.
INTEGRATION OF BEHAVIOR ACROSS TIME
There are numerous influences of past and future reflections on
behavior. People who reflect on and analyze the past can benefit.
Some reflect on prior traumas to gain useful insights about them,
thereby facilitating healthy recoveries (Pennebaker and Chung,
2007). Others analyze past actions to explore how theymight have
behaved differently, inviting lessons for achieving more desired
outcomes later (Epstude and Roese, 2008). Alternatively, people
who imagine or mentally relive the past can prolong prior mind-
sets rather than move beyond them (Lyubomirsky et al., 2006).
Imagining the past preserves and even amplifies prior emotions
and motivations, thereby affecting later behavior. For example,
ruminating about a prior, anger-provoking event can amplify
anger (Ray et al., 2008) and incite aggression (Bushman et al.,
2005).
Thoughts of the future are also influential and have self-
regulatory benefits (e.g., Schacter and Addis, 2007). Conscious
thoughts facilitate goal attainment by allowing people to set
plans for their goals (Gollwitzer, 1999) and energizing people
toward desired, future outcomes (Taylor et al., 1998; Oettingen
et al., 2001, 2009). Thoughts of the future can also sway behav-
ior by exposing people to the potential consequences of their
actions. For example, anticipation of regret can sway decisions
(Tetlock and Boettger, 1994; Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg
and Beattie, 1997).
CONSIDERATION OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS
Conscious thought also enables people to connect with others.
It enables perspective taking, which enhances social coordination
and negotiation outcomes (Galinsky et al., 2008a,b). It also allows
people to communicate effectively with others (Roßnagel, 2000),
which promotes cooperation in groups (e.g., Dawes et al., 1977;
Jorgenson and Papciak, 1981).
Conscious thought likewise allows people to modify their
behaviors to adhere to group expectations, norms, and laws, usu-
ally to the benefit of both the individual and the group. When
people think about and explain their actions, group decisions
(Scholten et al., 2007) and joint negotiation outcomes improve
(De Dreu et al., 2000), and interaction partners become more
cooperative, less hostile, andmore trusting (De Dreu et al., 2006).
Even absent any specific interaction partners, conscious thought
generally promotes doingwhat ismorally right (Caruso andGino,
2011; Amit and Greene, 2012).
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SELECTION FROM AMONG MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS
We propose that conscious thought is particularly useful for
allowing people to consider multiple possible actions or out-
comes. This is evident in counterfactual thinking. People often
cannot help but reflect on how they might have behaved dif-
ferently in the past. Such thinking can inspire new, improved
strategies for later behavior (Epstude and Roese, 2008).
Consideration of alternative actions is also apparent in self-
regulation and decisionmaking. Hofmann et al. (2009) noted that
explicit preferences and automatic impulses are often in conflict,
and that explicit preferences are likely to guide behavior when
people are free to reflect. In contrast, when conscious reflection is
hindered, people are more impulsive (Ward andMann, 2000) and
more likely to yield to external influences (Westling et al., 2006).
Conscious thought thus promotes adopting non-automatic forms
of responding.
Pursuit of alternative responses is evident as well in sports.
In almost every popular sport, researchers have found that the
mental rehearsal of motor skills is nearly as beneficial for perfor-
mance as physical practice (Druckman and Swets, 1988; Driskell
et al., 1994). Thus, conscious mental practice improves skilled
performance.
Each of the above patterns suggests that conscious thought
does indeed help cause behavior. In each case, the influence
of conscious thought on action is mostly indirect. Conscious
thought is generally not found to guide moment-to-moment
actions. However, reflections on the past enable people to improve
later behaviors, considerations of social or cultural information
sway decisions in favor of more cooperative responses, and men-
tal simulations of plans and skills can be used to reshape habits.
These findings support the notion that conscious thought is
slightly removed from present actions, but that it nevertheless
provides influential input into behavior.
CONCLUSION
The past several decades of research in psychology have revealed
some important limitations of conscious thought. Specifically, the
findings suggest that conscious thought is not the direct con-
troller of behavior that many assume it to be. We have argued
nonetheless that it plays a crucial role in shaping human behavior.
Our approach assumes that uniquely human capacities evolved
to solve uniquely human challenges (e.g., Baumeister, 2005).
Other animals interact with the physical environment (i.e., action
control) without needing the capacity for conscious thought
(Roberts, 2002). Humans, however, face the unique challenge of
striving in society and culture (Baumeister, 2005). We think that
it is precisely for that purpose that conscious thought developed.
In our review of the empirical research on conscious thought,
we found numerous kinds of evidence in support of this view
(Baumeister et al., 2011). The findings suggest that conscious
thought affects behavior indirectly, by integrating informa-
tion across time and from culture, so that multiple alternative
behaviors—particularly socially adaptive ones—can be consid-
ered and an optimal action selected.
We conclude that most or all of human behavior is likely
a product of conscious and unconscious processes working
together. The private daydreams, fantasies, and counterfactual
thoughts that pervade everyday life are far from being a feck-
less epiphenomenon. We see these processes as the place where
the unconscious mind assembles ideas so as to reach new conclu-
sions about how best to behave, or what outcomes to pursue or
avoid. Rather than directly controlling action, conscious thought
provides the input from these kinds of mental simulations to the
executive. Conscious thought offers insights about the past and
future, socially shared information, and cultural rules. Without it,
the complex forms of social and cultural coordination that define
human life would not be possible.
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